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Commercialising Citizenship in Crisis EU:  The case of Immigrant Investor 
Programmes 
 
Owen Parker1 
University of Sheffield 
o.parker@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
Immigrant investor programmes (IIPs) Ȃ aimed at attracting investment in 
return for residency or citizenship for wealthy foreigners Ȃ have proliferated in 
EU member states in recent years. Such schemes constitute part of a much 
broader commercialisation of citizenship, which has intensified during the crisis. 
They have been particularly controversial in the EU context because they rely for 
their attractiveness in large part on the reality of EU citizenship and the rights of 
mobility and residence that it entails. The European Commission, among others, 
has presented them as threat to national citizenship and yet the EU at once 
champions  Ǯ-ǯ   is arguably culpable in the very 
commercialisation of citizenship of which investor schemes are a stark 
manifestation. This paper unpacks the tensions in the theory and politics of 
investor migration in the recent EU context, arguing that they reveal what is 
termed Ǯǯ-level citizenship.  
Key words: investor immigration; citizenship; EU citizenship; crisis; 
commercialisation. 
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Introduction 
 
Since 2010 a number of EU member states have controversially launched or 
significantly liberalised so-called immigrant investor programmes (IIPs) aimed 
at attracting investments by wealthy foreigners Ȃ more specifically, so-called 
third country nationals Ȃ in return for residency or citizenship rights. This paper 
considers the politics of these schemes and its broader implications for our 
understanding of a multi-level citizenship in the contemporary EU (among 
others, see Maas, 2013). It argues that they are a particularly stark manifestation 
of the Ǯ  ǯ ȋǡ  ? ?02) and citizenship, which 
has intensified since the onset of the economic crisis in the late 2000s. Perhaps 
because of their starkness in this respect, IIPs Ȃ in particular those coined by  Ǯ  ǯ schemes Ȃ have met with significant opposition. As 
Shachar and Hirschl (2014, p. 254-55) ǡ ǲ   
frequent links between wealth and privileged access to political membership 
threatens not only the implementation of the ideal [of citizenship], but the ideal 
itselfǤǳ	ǡ political membership marks an ǡǲhe semi-sacrosanct realm of citizenship, a 
realm that we might have thought of as the last bastion of the sovereignty of ǳ(Shachar and Hirschl, 2014, p. 252). Such critiques 
implicitly or explicitly assert the importance of a social-contractarian imaginary 
of citizenship that is understood to be under threat. However, opposition to 
these IIPs is far from unequivocal in an EU context where a widely valued EU 
citizenship is itself underpinned by a commercial or market logic, which 
transcends what for many is a problematic national(ist) citizenship.  
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The paper draws on this case in order to conceptualise the broader politics of a 
contemporary multi-level citizenship in the EU in terms of four discourses. A Ǯ ǯ    the Ǯcommercialisationǯ of 
national citizenship, as manifest in these recent IIPs. A Ǯ ǯ
discourse associated with the social-contractarian opposition to such processes 
enunciated above, or the attempted Ǯde-commercialisationǯ of citizenship. A Ǯǯto a large extent with EU citizenship, 
which emphasises the constitutive importance of the market in potentially 
transcending national(ist) citizenship and has represented an important 
backdrop to the recent politics of investor migration. And Ǯǯ
discourse Ȃ less present in the particular debate on investor migration Ȃ which 
would see an uploading of a substantive social-contractarian citizenship to EU 
level, including but not limited to naturalisation policy.  
 
In juxtaposing the four discourses highlighted above via an examination of the 
original case of IIPs, the paper makes both a distinctive contribution to the small 
extant literature on these schemes and a broader conceptual contribution to 
debates on a multi-level citizenship in Europe. On the one hand, a comprehensive 
understanding of the sometimes confusing debates around the empirical case of 
IIPs arguably requires us to bring together both a consideration of distinct levels 
of governance Ȃ in this case national and European or, more abstractly, 
communitarian and cosmopolitan Ȃ and a political economy lens concerned with 
the relationship between a social contract and the market. On the other hand, 
while each of the four abovementioned discourses is present in a large and 
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multidisciplinary extant literature on contemporary citizenship in Europe (as 
highlighted in particular in section III below), the conceptual novelty of this 
intervention lies in its attempt to bring them together. Such discourses, when 
considered alongside each other in this way, are constitutive of what I term a Ǯǯ         a multi-level 
citizenship in the EU.  
 
Explicating this quadrilemma via the recent politics of investor migration, the 
argument unfolds in three steps. First, it maps and contextualises recent IIPs in 
terms of the economic crisis and the aforementioned Ǯ 
sovereigntǯ. Second, it considers the debate over ǯ - Ǯǯ, focusing in particular on the Commissionǯ response, which Ȃ        Ǯ ǯ   
adoptive state Ȃ rested on the assertion of a social-contractarian national 
citizenship. This intervention was surprising given that ǲcitizenship acquisition 
and loss is explicitly identified in the treaties as a matter of exclusive member  ǳ (Maas, 2016: 4). And the nature of the intervention was 
surprising given that the Commission generally champions a distinctly post-
national EU citizenship. In a third step     ǯ
position Ȃ and, indeed, between the different contributions to the debate on 
investor citizenship and migration Ȃ are conceptualised in terms of the Ǯǯ. Finally, in conclusion, the paper cautions against Ǯǯǡat once suggesting that  Ǯ ǯ  might be contingently promoted as a more 
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effective response to the commercialisation of citizenship in contemporary Ǯǯ EU. 
 
I. Commercialising Citizenship in the EU 
 
IIPs have long been a feature of the immigration policy toolkit of governments.  
The actual benefits vary considerably in practice and can be difficult to quantify, 
but they all reflect a desire on the part of governments to attract the wealthy 
investor in order to, in one way or another, stimulate the national economy 
(Migration Advisory Committee, February 2014, Sumption and Hooper, 2014, Xu 
et al., 2015). For investors they offer a range of potential benefits: a route to 
naturalisation and residence in a desirable location, often including access to 
education systems for children; greater access to global visa free travel; an ǮǯǢǡ
in some instances, important tax advantages. Certainly IIPs have been doing a 
booming business in recent years due to a combination of increased emerging 
market wealth and increased global instability (Sumption and Hooper, 2014, p. 1, 
Xu, et al., 2015).  
 
Programmes vary considerably in terms of the rights that they grant and the 
obligations that they place on potential investors. While some grant temporary 
residence to the would-be investor with variable tracks to permanent residence 
and/or citizenship, others grant relatively immediate citizenship.  While some 
require investment in the private sector Ȃ including in business and property Ȃ 
others require a payment to the government Ȃ either in the form of a direct 
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transfer to a national agency or the purchase of government bonds (Sumption 
and Hooper, 2014).  While some require significant physical in-country 
residence others require little or no presence.  IIPs of all of these sorts have long 
existed.  Cases where the rights are granted quickly and are substantial and the 
obligations are relatively limited include some Caribbean small island nations 
such as St Kitts and Nevis and the Commonwealth of Dominica (Dzankic, 2012).  
Cases where the rights are initially fewer and the accrual of further rights 
conditional on meeting substantial obligations include traditional immigrant 
countries such as Australia, Canada (Ley, 2010) and the US.  
 
IIPs are not entirely new to the EU.  Between 1989 and 1998 Ireland permitted 
the discretionary granting of immediate citizenship to investors (Carrera, 2014, 
p. 11-12) and Austria has long practiced something similar (Dzankic, 2012). The 
UK and France run IIPs that grant residence conditional on large investments 
(Dzankic, 2015, Warrall and O'Murchu, 9 December 2013). It is important to note 
too that some 22 of 28 EU member states allow for discretionary naturalisation 
(Dzankic, 2015) on the grounds of, inter alia, a contribution to the nation, its 
culture, sporting or scientific prowess or economic success. Such discretion may 
be used to informally (and even secretively) grant citizenship on the basis of 
economic criteria (æ©, 2015).  
 
A number of IIPs have been introduced or reformed in the EU context in recent 
years. Table 1 offers a schematic overview of those launched since 2010 in terms 
of the relative rights and obligations that are attached to them (see Dzankic 
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[2015], Carrera [2014] and Xu [2015] for more comprehensive and detailed 
mappings).   
 ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥINSERT TABLE 1 (APPENDED AT END) HERE ǥǥǥǥǥ 
 
Any ranking of IIPs and the obligations and rights that they entail can only be 
schematic because their relative attractiveness will, to a large extent, lie in the 
eye of the beholder Ȃ or potential investor Ȃ to the extent that they will have to 
balance the extent and nature of the obligations against the rights offered in 
terms of their particular needs and means. For instance, an assessment of 
obligations will relate not simply to the size of investment but also to its nature Ȃ 
whether for instance it amounts to a donation or offers a return on capital Ȃ and 
broader tax and other financial issues. And an assessment of rights will depend 
on individual investor requirements: do they need to be able to reside in any 
member state of the EU; is the ability to travel enough; and do they want to 
actually spend time in the country? These and other non-economic questions 
mean that investor deliberations will vary considerably.  
 
This important caveat notwithstanding, those IIPs granting a fast track to 
citizenship (within at most one year), such as the Cypriot, Maltese and Bulgarian 
programmes, are placed at the top of Table 1 on the basis that they offer 
substantive rights quickly. National citizenship is certainly a particularly useful 
asset in the EU context for potential investor migrants because EU citizenship Ȃ 
which encompasses the right to movement and residence throughout the EU Ȃ is 
derivative of member state citizenship. The obligations in terms of levels of 
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investment are quite different, however, with Cyprus requiring an investment of  ? ? ȋ  important exceptions discussed below) and Malta 
and Bulgaria2 requiring a ? ?mn for rapid naturalisation (though whereas 
the latter may accrue a return, the former investment does not). The other IIPs 
listed in Table 1 are so- Ǯ ǯ3 programmes. These do not grant 
residency rights in other member states, but do offer the right to travel within 
the Schengen area for substantial periods each year. Such rights will be sufficient 
for many investors who prefer the lower obligations in terms of investment 
(Wise, 8 October 2014).     ? ? ? ?ǡ 
Latvia and Greece, and many Ǯǯprogrammes require very 
limited in-country physical presence.  
 
In short, both EU citizenship and mobility rights associated with residency 
represent important opportunity structures for member states wishing to attract 
investment in return for some form of membership rights. It is still too early to 
draw definitive conclusions about the success of these IIPs in monetary terms, 
but a number of states had, as of the end of 2015, each attracted investments 
worth hundreds of millions of euros. These figures are, of course, particularly 
significant for smaller states. Malta, for instance, stands   ? ?
around one-fifth of GDP if it achieves its target and attracts 1800 investors 
(Sumption and Hooper, 2014, p. 7) (as of May 2015, it had received 585 
                                                        
2 Ǯ-ǯȋȌǤǡ
http://www.investbulgaria.eu/a/en/bulgarian-immigrant-investor-program/investment-
options.html 
3 Among many other promotional websites, see: http://golden-visa-europe.com/ 
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applications).4 By contrast, in the UK doubts have been raised about the 
economic benefits (Migration Advisory Committee, February 2014). 
 
How might we make sense of the emergence of such programmes, both in ǫǯ(2002) broad-brush history of the 
evolution of tax havens in the context of the trans-nationalisation of corporate 
activity since around the end of the nineteenth century is instructive in this 
respect. It is emblematic of the ways in which certain governments transformed 
themselves from authorities seeking to regulate and extract taxation from capital Ȃ corporate and individual Ȃ into agents competing with each other to attract 
capital on the basis of low regulation and taxation.  Palan describes the evolution 
of tax havens and these competing states in terms of the tension between 
increasingly global capital mobility and the discrete sovereign state. He notes 
that as governments granted equal rights to foreign or international entities that 
chose to locate assets or parts of their businesses in a particular jurisdiction, so Ǯǯǣ 
 
Individǡ      ǡ  ǲǳ  
capacity in one jurisdiction and in another capacity in another Ǥǲǡǳ
physically over different jurisdictions, they were offered fictional or 
juridical location (Palan, 2002, p. 170).   
 
                                                        
4 Figure reported on website: http://www.maltaimmigration.com/ (checked January 2016). 
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 Ǯǯ(Palan, 2002, p. 172) thereby Ǯǯ
for low regulation and taxation and many sovereign entities obliged by making 
themselves attractive for such shoppers. Governments effectively created the Ǯǯǡ
to regulate and tax, at least with respect to wealthy corporate or individual 
entities able to take advantage of the possibility of this juridical dispersion.  In 
the context of investor migration it is precisely the possibility and advantages of 
a form of juridical dispersion that governments and associated private 
organisations seek to market to would- Ǯ ǯ (see, for instance, 
Kalin, 2013).5  
 
Palan neatly characterises these broader ǮǯǤ  While such processes may have been constrained to some extent in 
the aftermath of the second world war in the context of the Bretton Woods 
settlement (and the possibility of certain capital controls), they returned in the 
1970s context of neo-liberalism, marked by falling wages, spiralling credit and 
the associated empowerment (and deregulation) of the financial sector.  Against 
this backdrop, citizenship has itself been commercialised or Ǯǯ(Joppke, 
2010). Immigration policies in Western countries have opened borders on a 
selective basis, primarily for the high skilled or high net-worth and, in   ǯ    Ǯ ǯǡ 
have become increasingly amenable to the possibility of multiple (or at least ǮǯȌ  (Joppke, 2010). The sentiment of UK Immigration Minister 
                                                        
5 Ǯǯǣ
http://www.artoncapital.com/ 
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 ? ? ? ?ǲǳ(a 
category which includes the wealthy) is one that has been echoed throughout the 
western world (BBC, 12 September 2000; Menz and Caviedes, 2010). The 
commercialisation of sovereignty also has an impact on an internal citizenship. 
Indeed, it has eroded the capacity to support nationally based welfare, 
employment and industrial policies or at least been used as a pretext for such an 
erosion. We have consequently witnessed moves to forms of social policy that 
shift the manageme         ǲǯǯthat differs from that reflected in the political grammar of post war ǳ (Jayasuriya, 2005, p. 2).  
 
In short, a commercialisation of sovereignty and an associated neo-liberal turn 
impact upon an internal and external citizenship and on the state that governs 
such citizenship. As Brown (2015, p. 108) has succinctly put it, ǲ
the ascendency of neoliberal reason that the citizen-subject converts from a 
political to an economic being and that the state is remade from one founded in ǤǳIndeed, while the individual is    Ǯ ǯ to be attracted or nurtured, the 
corporate sector is both aped and employed by government. This is evident in 
such stark contemporary practices as Ǯ ǯ (Browning, 2015) in 
which governments explicitly view themselves as entities competing for fluid 
global capital and deploy private sector consultancies for the purpose of Ǯbrand-
managementǯ. Investor programmes similarly reflect a desire to attract capital 
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and, as noted, private sector intermediaries also proliferate in this context (Xu, 
2015, p. 7).6  
 
The EU and its antecedents have long been both impacted by and implicated in 
this commercialisation of sovereignty and citizenship in the European context. 
The activism of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Mattli, 1999) and the 
emergence of the single market project have arguably transformed member 
states into actors that must today conform to a market logic in accordance with 
the four freedoms of movement (of goods, capital, services and people). They are Ǯ ǯ (Cerny, 1997)  Ǯ-ǯ  has 
become punishable within EU law. Moreover, to the limited extent that the EU 
has engaged with questions of social policy, it has aligned with the trends 
described in the foregoing and envisaged the task of social policy as the   Ǯǯ       
increasingly flexible labour markets (Parker, 2012, p. 208). The emergence of a 
distinctly post-national EU citizenship rooted to a large extent in a market logic 
of free moving human capital has arguably further contributed to this Ǯǯ. Indeed, important ECJ activism in this area both preceding and 
following the proclamation of EU citizenship in the Maastricht treaty has, in 
asserting an expansive notion of non-discrimination, for some effectively 
challenged member state fiscal autonomy (Joppke, 2010, p. 24-28; Bellamy, 
2015, p. 563).  
 
                                                        
6 Nation branding and investor migration intersect in concrete terms to the extent that the 
private organisations promoting the latter often refer to the former in seeking to inform their ȋǡǮ-ǯ
Kalin, 2013, pp. 79-98). 
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If the EU has been culpable in this broad direction of travel it has arguably been 
even more directly culpable in the most recent wave of the commercialisation of 
sovereignty in Europe in the context of the financial and economic crisis. Indeed, 
the regime of monetary and economic governance that has accompanied 
monetary union from its inception (Gill, 1998) has significantly hardened in the 
context of responses to the crisis (among many others, Oberndorfer, 2015). A 
regime of fiscal consolidation (austerity) has delimited the room for manoeuvre 
for states in economic policy-making, particularly those hardest hit by the crisis.  
Investment in productive sectors rooted in a range of counter-cyclical spending 
is not possible given these hardened structural constraints and such states have 
instead sought to revive dysfunctional economic models via the further 
commercialisation of sovereignty. This has involved, inter alia, programmes of 
privatisation and the incentivisation of inward private investment, of which IIPs 
are a part.  
 
The impact of the crisis and its governance is, it should be noted, neither a 
necessary or sufficient condition for the introduction of IIPs. However, a number 
of member states that were significantly affected by the crisis have opened some 
of the most liberal investor programmes since 2010. These include those 
countries that were heavily indebted Ȃ either via public or private debt Ȃ in the 
period leading up to the global and eurozone crises and those that became 
heavily indebted following these crises as a result of various contagion effects.  
As Table 1 shows, they include countries such as Greece, where the impact of the 
crisis has been particularly acute; countries such as Latvia and Spain where the 
financial sectors required support following the bursting of house price bubbles; 
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countries hit by the contagion effects of the crises elsewhere, such as Cyprus and 
Bulgaria Ȃ where banking sectors were over-exposed to problems in Greece Ȃ 
and Portugal, which was arguably the victim of speculative attacks which led to 
unsustainable interest rates on borrowing.   
 
The type of investments required reveal a desire in many of these contexts to, as 
noted, revive economic models that were hard-hit. Thus, for instance, Spain, 
Latvia, Portugal and Greece Ȃ all countries where property prices fell 
significantly between 2007 and 2014 (Eurostat HPI, accessed June 2015) Ȃ 
encourage investment in property markets. In certain cases the link between 
these IIPs and the crisis has been made explicit. The reform of the Cypriot 
programme was implemented in May 2013 just two months after foreign ȋȌȋ ? ?Ȍ     Ǯ-ǯ        ? ? ? ?Ǥ 
individuals are explicitly offered a fast-track to citizenship by way of 
compensation in the Cypriot legislation (Hope et al., 17 March 2013; Dzankic, 
2015, p.9). The preamble to the Spanish legislation explicitly frames its investor 
programme (along with other legislation packaged under the heading Ǯ    ǯȌ     
crisis (Law 14/2013).7  
 
Against this backdrop I would concur to a large extent with Spiro (2014, p. 9) 
who says of IIPs (and particularly those that offer rapid naturalisation) that they 
                                                        
7 See, 
http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Embajadas/ABUDHABI/es/VisadosVisas/Paginas/LeyEmprende
dores.aspx 
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ǡ ǲ   ȏȐ       Ǥ 
citizenship still meant what it used to mean, if it still represented special ties as a  ǡ       Ǥǳ  What 
such reasoning cannot easily explain, however, is the vocal opposition that they Ȃ 
particularly those IIPs offering rapid citizenship Ȃ have attracted within the 
European context. 
 
II. De-Commercialising Citizenship in the EU 
 
The initial proposal for ǯ citizenship IIP stated that citizenship would be      ? ? ? ?   , with additional costs 
specified for dependents. The opposition parties strongly opposed the bill that 
was put before the Maltese Parliament in November 2013 and proposed 
significant amendments that would, among other things, withdraw the fast-track 
route to citizenship, requiring of the investor five years residence including 30 
days per year spent in Malta.  While the Prime Minister initially defended his ǯ ǡ    ǡ    
abroad led to an amendment to the initial proposal in December 2013 (Camilleri, 
26 November 2013). The reform increased the size of the total investment to  ? ?Ǥ ? ? ǡincluding a requirement to invest in property (see Table 1) and 
capped the number of investors to 1800. Introducing these reforms, Prime ǡǲ  ? ?Ǥ ? ?      ǳ (cit in Carrera, 2014, p. 5). However, 
opponents inside and beyond Malta were not convinced.   
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The programme was widely reported and scrutinised throughout the EU in early 
2014. The European Parliament debated what it termed  Ǯ  ǯ 
schemes in a plenary session in January, with a clear focus on Malta. Vivienne 
Reding, the Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, 
stated at this session that,  
 
Member states should use their prerogatives to award citizenship in a 
spirit of sincere cooperation with the other member states. In compliance 
with the criterion used under public international law, Member states 
should only award citizenship to persons where there is a 'genuine link' or 
'genuine connection' to the country in question ... Citizenship must not be 
up for sale!  (15 January 2014, emphasis added)    
 
In a position paper circulated to other member states in advance of the EP 
debate, the Maltese government stated that, ǲ
a nation to dete     ǳ     ǲǳ(Malta, 5 
January 2014). The Commission threatened to do just this, its legal reasoning 
drawing on the public international law referred to by Reding and, in particular, 
the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case. This, 
according to the Commission, established that, while naturalisation is indeed a 
matter for sovereign states, when the naturalisation decision of one state 
impacts upon another state, the latter may in certain circumstances legitimately 
refuse to recognise that decision (Carrera, 2014, pp. 20-21). In particular, it may ǮǯȋǯǮǯȌ
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Ȃ      Ǯ ǯ Ȃ between the individual 
concerned and the state that has naturalised that individual.  
 
Whether based on appropriate legal reasoning or not, the threat of legal action 
prompted a meeting between the Commission and Maltese authorities at the end 
of January, following which a joint press statement was issued wherein further 
amendments to the scheme were announced which would require investors to 
supply evidence of 12-months of residence before nationality would be granted.  
The Commission expressed its satisfaction at the amendments and in February 
the programme was amended to this effect (Individual Investor Programme of 
the Repubic of Malta, 4 February 2014, p. 3). However, doubts remained 
regarding what 12-months residency would mean in practice. The European 
Commission insisted that it would   Ǯǯ  ǡ
although it is unclear Ǯǯ (Inverview with 
official DG Justice, 17 June 2015). 
 
Malta was, in many respects, unfortunate to become the focal point of debate and 
critique in relation to its programme. The investment in the Maltese case will be  Ǯ ǯǡ  ǮǯǤ
contribution in a way that some of the aforementioned IIPs Ȃ where the 
investment is, for instance, targeted at property or the banking sector Ȃ will not 
clearly do so.  Moreover, as noted above, it is not the only EU member state to 
offer a fast-track to citizenship for wealthy investors, or the only country which 
offers this benefit with limited residency requirements. That said, the 
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Commission reportedly had, as of June 2015, initiated a dialogue with Cyprus in 
relation to its scheme (Inverview with official DG Justice, 17 June 2015).    
  ǯ      surprising because of the 
apparent absence of a clear-cut legal basis (Maas, 2016). Indeed, it represented ǡ ǲ          exclusive 
terrain of competence by EU member states Ȃ namely the grounds for bestowing 
citizenshipǳ (Carrera, 2014, p. 31). It was also surprising in the context of the ǮǯǮǯcitizenship discussed above, which, as noted, 
the EU has contributed to in various ways and which both the recent citizenship 
and residency schemes contribute towards. Indeed, this broader 
commercialisation of citizenship Ȃ   Ǯǯ   Ȃ      ǯ
primary concern when intervening in this case. Rather  ǯ   Ǯ ǯ is more logical when regarded as a means to the 
broader end of preserving the Ǯ ǯ among member states 
required to sustain an EU citizenship rooted in free movement.  
 
Member states alone are able to bestow EU citizenship via national 
naturalisation policies and, in the context of these IIPs, this was seen as a 
valuable commodity that could be marketed and effectively sold.  But the right to 
free movement accompanying EU citizenship also leads to a mutual interest 
among member states in their respective naturalisation policies, particularly 
when they attract large numbers of so-called third country nationals. From this 
perspective, the Commission intervention is likely to have reflected a concern 
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that some member states may seek to impose limits on freedom of movement if 
other member states were to adopt naturalisation policies that are excessively Ǯǯ ȋǮǯȌ. They may do so for economic 
reasons Ȃ because they feel their own IIPs are being undercut (Warrell and 
Fontanella-Kahn, 9 December 2013) Ȃ or political reasons Ȃ because they feel 
that the rapid naturalisation of wealthy individuals has a potentially pernicious 
effects on national citizenship, including risks associated with security and 
financial integrity (Xu, et al., 2015, p. 7-8). Such concerns pertain primarily to 
programmes that grant citizenship rapidly because of different EU rules 
associated with, respectively, citizens of national states and long-term residents. 
EU law provides a greater margin for member states to restrict the movement of 
resident third country nationals than it does member state citizens (European 
Commission, 2013, p. 18-19). Taken together, these factors are a more logical 
explanation for both  ǯ intervention and its exclusive focus on 
citizenship schemes.  
 
There is, however, an irony in the Commissǯ Ǯ ǯ in 
order to protect an extant post-national citizenship.  In making such an assertion 
it at once risks undermining such a post-national citizenship that in many 
respects transcends such links. In concrete terms, as Carrera (2014, p. 27) says, 
its position runs the  ǲ
the genuine link as a way to justify restrictive domestic policies on the ǥwith other EU general principles 
(such as that of non-discrimination, diversity and fundamental rights) remains at Ǥǳ      Ǯ ǯ     
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citizenship and preserving the values of a post-national citizenship that in many 
respects surpass such links is certainly a treacherous one.   
 
III. Multi-level citizenship Ǯǯ 
 ǯ position arguably reflects an attempt to navigate a normative 
tension in contemporary political theory and practice between a discourse that   Ǯǯ       Ǥ The former 
seeks to overcome discrimination, particularly based on a nationalism that can 
be associated with a delimited citizenship, while the latter seeks to preserve the 
democratic and socialising possibilities of a delimited social-contractarian 
citizenship. The former seeks to open citizenship (and associated rights) as a 
category to ever more groups of people and may explicitly, or often implicitly, 
see the market (and the commercialisation of sovereignty) as a positive tool of 
such opening to the extent that it embodies the value of non-discrimination (at 
least on all grounds other than economic). In extreme libertarian form such a 
discourse would advocate the extension of the commercialisation of sovereignty; 
a libertarian openness, or overcoming, of political and physical borders and the 
transcendence of the institutions of both state and national citizenship as we 
know them (Caplan, 7 October 2015). Freedom, from this perspective, is often 
conceived in terms of a radical autonomy or freedom from government. The 
latter, in contrast, seeks to close citizenship because in its substantive social-
contractarian form it is only conceivable within the confines of some kind of 
delimited community of fate (Walzer, 1983).  It is only within such a context that 
the collective public (as opposed to individual private) interest can be pursued 
 21 
and so the commercialisation of sovereignty and broader processes of neo-
liberal globalisation are regarded as threat. Freedom, from this perspective, is 
often conceived as freedom guaranteed by government.  
 
Both sides Ȃ what I term a Ǯ ǯ  Ǯ ǯ
discourse Ȃ point to important exclusionary tendencies of the other. The former      ǯ   and the effects of 
exclusion and discrimination  Ǯǯ
delimited polity. The latter points to the exclusionary effects of the market, 
which potentially undermines social cohesion and destroys the formal equality 
of citizenship that permits democratic self-rule. As Walzer (1983, p. 39) has 
evocatively put it, ǮǮȏȐǥto create a world 
without walls, but rather to create a thousand petty fortresses.ǯǯ Such a tension 
has animated recent legal and jurisprudential debate on the normative value of 
EU citizenship (for instance see, Kochenov [2014a] for an articulation of 
something close to the former discourse and Bellamyǯ [2015] Ȃ in my view, 
compelling Ȃ critique). Such a tension is, as noted, also present in the ǯ     ǯ    and, 
indeed, the broader reality of EU citizenship, which is rooted to a large extent in 
a market cosmopolitan ideal but risks extending itself to breaking point in the 
face of legal communitarian resistance.  
 
IIPs do not lend themselves to a clear-cut position from either side of this debate. ǡ           Ǯǯ
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and sovereignty or citizenship enunciated in section 1. While they pursue 
national(ist) or even communitarian goals, those goals are interpreted in quite 
crude neo-liberal economic terms. Thus, neither an ideal-typical legal 
communitarian or market cosmopolitan position would be likely to fully endorse 
IIPs. Legal communitarians would of course defend th ǯ  
matters of naturalisation, but would be strongly Ǯ ǯenunciated by the Commission. Concerns may relate not only to a 
lack of presence and participation, but also to the substance and magnitude of 
the political influence that wealthy investors Ȃ whether citizens or residents Ȃ 
might be in a position to wield. This may be direct, via, for instance, media 
ownership and party funding. It may also be indirect, through, for instance, 
having an inflationary effect on property prices. It may also be criminal or 
contrary to national security. Indeed, in practice it has been difficult for states 
(and perhaps not in the immediate interests of those administering these 
schemes) to exclude those investors with criminal connections or geopolitical 
links unfavourable to the host state (Xu, et al., 2015, p. 7-8). In the recent EU 
context widespread misgivings have been raised about the identity of some of 
those Russians buying property in Latvia (re: baltica, 2015) and this was a factor 
in the reform of the Latvian scheme in 2014, which substantially increased the 
investment criteria (Kuznetsov, 12 November 2013,  Ziverts, 2013). In Portugal a 
corruption scandal (The Economist, 17 November 2014) led to a short 
suspension of its scheme in 2015. And it has been reported that the UK investor 
scheme has been used as a means to launder the proceeds of corruption 
(Transparency International, 2015). 
 
 23 
In short, from a legal communitarian perspective that values citizenship as a 
political relationship within a necessarily delimited and cohesive community, the    Ǯ ǯ    the proliferating private actors 
promoting IIPs may be dangerously apolitical or even an oxymoron (Miller, 
2011). As presented by these actors, citizenship as a political relationship rooted 
in a social contract Ȃ underpinning rights and obligations or duties Ȃ is replaced 
by a notion based on at best very loose legalistic connections between polities 
(plural) and Ǯǯ mobile wealthy individuals.   
 
A market cosmopolitan perspective, on the contrary, might be less troubled by 
such schemes and even positive about their corrosive implications for an ideal 
social-contractarian notion of citizenship. Citizenship schemes are arguably no 
more ethically dubious than a host of other naturalisation policies that confer 
membership and which also have various potential spillover effects to other 
member states in the EU context. Kochenov (2014b) has noted for instance that 
many are naturalised on the dubious basis of bloodline (hardly a ǮǯȌ
or following a questionable citizenship test that long-time citizens would often 
struggle to pass. Moreover, these schemes are certainly more transparent than 
discretionary, often secretive, naturalisation practices that are, as noted above, 
permissible in the majority of member states.  From this perspective there is an 
arbitrariness in the conferral of membership and these methods are at least 
more transparent and rational than many others. That said, any endorsement 
from a market cosmopolitan perspective is likely to be equivocal. If this is a 
discourse that ultimately seeks to transcend the nation-state, endorsement of 
such programmes would certainly be tempered by a concern that states still act 
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as gatekeepers and national citizenship (however diminished) remains the prize 
(albeit as a route to EU citizenship).  Indeed, the state, nationalism and a national 
citizenship are, from this perspective, ethical problems to be overcome.  
 
This section has to this point identified three discourses that have been present 
in the political and scholarly debate on investor citizenship enunciated in the 
preceding sections: a Ǯmarket communitarianǯ, Ǯlegal communitarianǯ and Ǯmarket 
cosmopolitanǯ discourse. As noted in introduction, a fourth discourse, which has 
not been as present in this debate, logically presents itself at this juncture: 
namely, Ǯǯ discourse (see Table 2).  
 ǥǥǥǥǤINSERT TABLE 2 (APPENDED AT END) HERE ǥǥǥǥǤ 
 
Legal communitarian ideals of citizenship have been, in theory at least, 
generalised beyond the nation-ǡ  Ǯǯ (Habermas, 2001, 
Held, 2000, Linklater, 1998).  It is, in short, quite possible to adopt a Ǯlegal 
cosmopolitanǯ discourse Ǯǯctivity             Ǯǯthe prevailing market reality, rooted as it is in mobility and non-
discrimination. From this perspective, if both a political conception of citizenship 
(contra a neo-liberal reality) and a post-national EU settlement (contra a 
nationalist reality) are to be protected this would entail the promotion of a far Ǯǯ -national citizenship capable of offsett  Ǯǯ 
national citizenship and the commercialisation of sovereignty in the recent 
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European context. This would amount to a more substantive EU citizenship, 
which would involve the creation of something closer to, if not exactly, a federal 
state with redistributive capacity (for one example, see Habermas, 2001 and his 
many more recent interventions). In relation to the debate on investor 
citizenship, such a discourse offers the possibility of critiquing both the notion of 
a national sovereign right to decide questions of naturalisation Ȃ which would be 
uploaded to European or some other post-national level Ȃ and the market logics 
at play in these schemes. While such a discourse has much to offer given the 
tensions in a contemporary multi-level citizenship enunciated, we should be 
circumspect in our embrace of a legal cosmopolitan discourse, which is certainly 
not itself immune from critique. A legal communitarian may highlight the 
idealism inherent in such a perspective, noting the extant difficulty of developing  Ǯǯ    Ǥ8 And a market cosmopolitan 
would point to its capacity to reproduce the exclusionary features of nation-state 
beyond itself. While these valid critiques effectively caution that such a vision 
ought not be presented as an alternative definitive answer, it may be an 
important provisional one, as I discuss in conclusion. 
 
For now, though, I want to emphasise that the politics of this case and a multi-
level citizenship more generally can be conceptualised in terms of the four 
discourses identified in this section, which, when considered together, constitute  Ǯǯ (summarised in Table 2). This term captures the difficulty of 
                                                        
8 In practice it has, indeed, proved difficult to push a more substantive EU citizenship. While at 
certain junctures the European institutions, particularly ECJ, and certain member states have 
pushed the idea in various forms, they have been consistently blocked by other states (Maas, 
2013, p.19- ? ?ȌǤǮǯ
(that would underpin this more substantive citizenship) would be unrealisable and potentially 
stimulate national(ist) resistance. 
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adjudicating between these four discourses, each of which, as discussed, contains 
a particular vision of the citizen-subject replete with its own exclusions. The 
politics of a multi-level citizenship Ȃ as animated with reference to the case of 
investor migration in this paper Ȃ reveals the complex ways in which these 
discourses intersect and rely upon each other in practice, even as they 
simultaneously contradict each other in important respects. For instance, IIPs fit 
with a market communitarian discourse but nevertheless rely upon the 
cosmopolitan aspects of a post-national EU citizenship for their very 
attractiveness to investors. And in its intervention in this case the European 
Commission seemed to understand that an extant market cosmopolitan EU 
citizenship cannot ride roughshod over communitarian realities if it is to be 
sustained (just as ECJ case law has balanced market cosmopolitan ideals with 
communitarian sensitivities in relation to EU citizenship in recent years). While 
no definitive solution to this quadrilemma presents itself Ȃ and, as discussed in 
conclusion, nor should it be sought Ȃ its very conceptualisation does, I would 
argue, constitute a useful tool for deciphering and critically engaging with the 
politics of a multi-level citizenship more generally.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper has considered the politics of IIPs in the recent EU context and 
suggested that it Ȃ and the politics of a multi-level citizenship in Europe more 
generally Ȃ is animated by four discourses, which together constitute what I call  Ǯǯ (see Table 2).  Each discourse is underpinned by a particular 
normative position on the ideal citizen-subject and in relation to the spatial 
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context in which such an ideal could or should be realised. This quadrilemma 
should not, I would argue, be solved definitively in favour of a particular 
discourse Ȃ it should be preserved in the face of all such solutions (see also, 
Parker 2012, 2013). But that is not to say that a recognition of the quadrilemma 
should blunt a capacity for political action or normative insight; on the contrary, 
it might sensitise us to those historical moments or situations where an  Ǯǯ         
manifest itself in political reality with exclusionary consequence. 
.  
Just such a threat is, I have argued, present in the commercialisation of 
sovereignty and citizenship in the contemporary EU or what I termed a Ǯ
communitarianǯ discourse. This discourse awkwardly combines national(ist) 
closure (particularly    ǮǯȌ and neo-liberal policies 
which allow an opening to the few, including wealthy investor migrants. Such a 
discourse has intensified in many national contexts since the economic crisis 
began and the outright sale by member states of citizenship is but one Ȃ albeit a 
particularly stark Ȃ manifestation of such a discourse. What is particularly 
notable with many of the IIPs in this recent wave (in Europe and beyond) is that 
they are distinct even from the aforementioned policies aimed at attracting the Ǯǯ ǮǯǤprogrammes at 
least aim at attracting individuals who could, in accordance with a neo-liberal 
logic, offer something to a national community that might generate an ongoing 
income or profit stream. IIPs seem more interested in the one- Ǯǯ Ǯǯitute membership rights to accrue that 
capital. These particular humans seem to be invisible or irrelevant to the 
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calculations of many of the governments introducing these recent schemes for 
short-term gain; they may, indeed, be literally invisible Ǯǯ
that they will locate elsewhere and only infrequently touch down in the country 
offering citizenship. If citizenship becomes, in this way, synonymous with mobile          Ǯ ǯ  imates the 
demos is not only weakened, but fully expunged (Brown, 2015).  
 
As discussed in the foregoing, a Ǯ ǯ    
transcend the state may simply     Ǯ ǯǤ 
while a Ǯ ǯ istance may do important work in terms of 
reviving this figure, it entails Ȃ even requires Ȃ its own exclusions and closures. A Ǯ ǯǯ more substantive EU citizen-subject does not entirely 
evade these problems, but should nevertheless be nurtured as that which 
contingently keeps open     Ǯ ǯ  
cosmopolitan ideal of the post-national (see also, Parker, 2013, pp.177-180). 
Indeed, if the EU collectively is serious about the assertion of its Commissioner in Ǯǯand in its 
desire to support an EU citizenship that overcomes national(ist) discrimination, 
then it needs to take far more radical steps to develop a substantive political EU 
citizenship for the contemporary EU. The ongoing context of crisis renders this 
task at once extremely challenging and extremely urgent. 
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TABLES:  
 
Country/ Year  Obligations Rights 
Malta (2014) MEDIUM HIGH 
Bulgaria (2013) LOW TO MEDIUM MEDIUM TO HIGH 
Cyprus (2013) HIGH HIGH 
Hungary (2012) LOW MEDIUM 
Portugal (2012) LOW TO MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Latvia (2014 reform of 2010) LOW MEDIUM 
Malta (2013)9 LOW TO MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Ireland (2013 reform of 2012) LOW TO MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Netherlands (2013) MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Greece (2013) MEDIUM LOW 
Spain (2013) MEDIUM LOW 
 
Table 1: Schematic overview of rights and obligations in IIPs in the EU launched since 2010.  
(Compiled with reference to various legal frameworks, cross-referenced with Dzankic 2015, 
Carrera, 2014 and Xu 2015.) 
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